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And he shows that the same rules are precisely applicable to night
navigation, if the colored lights be adopted.
The rules thus suggested seem to us to have the requisites which
rules should have. They are effectual, they are easily intelligible,
and they are few. For the rest we refer the reader to Mr. Rothery's interesting brochure. We have read it ourselves with grdat
satisfaction, and hope that it will receive in the proper quarter the
consideration which it merits. It is a striking feature in the times,
that a legal functionary like Mr. Rothery is not contented to discharge the arduous duties of his position honorably and well, but
utilizes the opportunities which his office gives him, of benefiting
his country by extracurial labors of importance to the commerce of
the country and the lives of our countrymen.
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Circuit Court of the United Statesfor the -Districtof lTew JerseySeptember, 1857.
MILNOR VS. THE NEW JERSEY RAIL ROAD COM'PANY ET AL.
SHARDLOW VS. THE SAME.

BIGELOW vs. THE SAME.
MILNOR vs

NEWARK PLANK ROAD COMPANY ET. AL.
SHARDLOW vs. THE SAME.

1. A court of the United States has no jurisdiction to restrain by injunction the
erection of a bridge over a navigable river lying wholly within the limits of a

particular State, where such erection is authorized by the legislature of the State,
though a port of entry has been created by Congress above the bridge. Dicta in
Devoe vs. Penrose Ferry Bridge Co. 3 Am. L. Reg. 83, overruled; and in Penna.
vs. Wheeling Bridge Co. 13 How. 579, explained.
2. Construction of Acts of the legislature of New Jersey with regard to the proprietors
of the bridges-over the rivers Passaic and Hackensack, and the agreements made
thereunder with respect to these rivers.
.3. If such Acts and agreements give to the corporation a franchise or exclusive
privilege of taking toll, and erecting a bridge on these rivers, that franchise or
,privilege may be taken by the legislature of the State, under its right of eminent
domain, on providing compensation.
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4. Such franchise or exclusive privilege, if it exists, is vested in the corporation at
large and not in the individual members, and may be 'waived or relinquished by
the action of a majority of the corporators.
5. The mere establishment of a particular line of road, and erection of a bridge in
a particular location, in a town, by a railroad company, after a controversy -with
the inhabitants with respect thereto, does not amount to a contract so as to preilade the company, after a lapse of time, from changing the direction of their line
and the position of the bridge.

These were several bills in equity, for injunctions and other
relief, upon the facts and for the purposes set forth in the opinion
below. Interlocutory injunctions had been granted, and now,
September 22d, 1857, upon final hearing, and after a full argument,
the opinion of the court was delivered by
GRIER, J.-The object of these five several bills is to obtain
injunctions prohibiting the erection of certain bridges over the Passaic'river. One of these is proposed to be erected at a point called
the Commercial Dock, in the city of Newark, by the New Jersey
Railroad and Transportation Company. The other, by the Newark
Plank Road Company, near the mouth of the Passaic river and
some two and a half miles below the wharves of the port of Newark.
The erection of these bridges is authorized by the legislature of
New Jersey. They are required to have pivot draws, leaving two
passages of sixty-five feet each for the passage of vessels navigating
the river or harbor. The first of these bridges is required in order
to avoid certain curves in the railroad where it passes through
Newark, and to make it straight. The other to accommodate the
large and increasing commerce between the cities of New Y'ork and
Newark, on the plank road connecting the lower end of Newark
with Jersey City.
It will not be necessary to a proper consideration of the several
questions affecting the decision of these cases, to give an abstract
either of the pleadings or the testimony. Where opinions are
received in evidence, there can be no restraint as to quantity.
Such testimony is always affected by the feelings, prejudices and
interests of the witnesses, and is of course contradictory. A skipper will pronounce every bridge a nuisance, while travelers on
plank or railroads will not think it proper that their persons of pro-

MILNOR vs. RAILROAD COMPANY.

perty should be subject to delay, or risk of destruction, to avoid an
inconvenience or slight impediment to sloops and schooners; owners
of wharves or docks who may apprehend that their interests may
be affected by a change of location of a bridge, are unanimous in
their opinion that public improvement had better be arrested than
that their interests should be affected. In this conflict of testimony and discordant opinion, we shall not stop to make any invidious comparisons as to the credibility of the witnesses, but assume
such facts as we believe to be proven, without attempting to vindicate the propriety of our assertions.
I. The first of the three great questions so ably discussed by the
learned counsel in these cases, is briefly and lucidly stated inthe
following propositions, which complainants have endeavored to
establish:
1st, "That the Passaic river is a public highway of commerce,
which under the constitution of the United States has been regulated by Congress."
2d, "That the free navigation of the Passaic river as a common
highway having been established by regulation of Congress, and by
compact between the States, it cannot lawfully be obstructed by
force of any State authority or legislation."
8d, "The bridges proposed to be erected by the New Jersey
Railroad Company and Plank Road Company will be each an obstruction to the free navigation of the Passaic river, and public
nuisances."
"Consequently this court will enjoin their erection, on complaint
of any injured party."
So far as these propositions involve the facts of the case, we find
them to be as follows:
The Passaic is a river having its springs and its outlet wholly
within the State of New Jersey.
Though a small and narrow river, it is navigable for sloops,
schooners, and the smaller classes of steamboats as far as the tide
flows, some miles above Newark; at the upper end, and above this
city there are several bridges, with small draws, and difficult to
pass. These were all erected by authority of the State, and one
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of them more than fifty years ago. The city of Newark has been
made a port of entry by act of Congress, has some little foreign
commerce, and some with ports of other States. Being in fact but
a manufacturing suburb of New York, much the largest portion of
her commerce is with that city, and carried on the rail and plank
roads connecting them.
That the proposed bridges will in some measure cause an obstruction to the navigation of the river, and some inconvenience to vessels passing the draws, is certainly true. Every bridge may be
said to be an obstruction in the channel of a river, but it is not
necessarily a nuisance. Bridges are highways as necessary to the
commerce and intercourse of the public as rivers. That which the
public convenience imperatively demands, cannot be called a public
nuisance because it causes some inconvenience or affects the private
interests of a few individuals.
Now, if every bridge over a navigable river be not necessarily a
nuisance, but may be erected for the public benefit, without being
considered in law or in fact a nuisance, though certainly an inconvenience affecting the navigation of the river, the question recurs,
who is to judge of this necessity ? Who shall say what shall be the
height of a pier, the width of a draw, and how it shall be erected,
managed and controlled ? Is this a matter of judicial discretion or
legislative enactment ? Can that be a nuisance which is authorized
by law ? Does a State lose the great police power of regulating
her own highways and bridges over her own rivers, because the tide
may flow therein, or as soon as they become a highway to a port of
entry within her own borders ? In the course of seventy years'
.practical construction of the Constitution, no act of Congress is to
be found regulating such erections, or assuming to license a bridge,
over such a river wholly within the jurisdiction of a State, (if we
except the doubtful precedent of the Cumberland road) and during
all this time States have assumed and exercised this power. If we
now deny it to the States, where do we find any authority in the
Constitution or acts of Congress fqr assuming it ourselves ?
. These are questions which must be resolved before this court can
constitute itself "arbiter pontium," and assume the power of decid-
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ing where and when the public necessity demands a bridge, what is
a sufficient draw, or how much inconvenience to navigation will constitute a nuisance.
The complainants in these several bills, in order to show jurisdiction in the court, have stated themselves to be citizens of the State
of New York. Their right to a remedy in the courts of the United
States is .not asserted, on account of the subject matter of the controversy, nor do they allege any peculiar jurisdiction as given to us
by any act of Congress; but rest upon their personal right as
citizens of another State to sue in this tribunal. It is very apparent, also, that the complainants, if not introduced as mere John
Does or nominal parties (while those really contending are used as
witnesses) are at least volunteers in the controversy, "post litem
motam," who have bought the right to an expected injury for the
luxury of the litigation.
Without stopping to laud this exhibition of public spirit by citizens of a neighboring State, it is plain by their own showing, that
they can demand no other remedy from this court than would
be administered by the tribunals of the State of New Jersey in a
suit between her own citizens. A citizen of New York who purchases wharves inNewark or owns a vessel navigating to that port,
has no greater right than the citizen of New Jersey. A court of
chancery in New Jersey would not interfere with the course of
public improvements authorized by the State, at the instance of a
wharf owner on the suggestion that a change in the location of a
bridge would cause a depreciation in the value of.his property.
This is not a result, for which (if the court can give any remedy at
all,) it will interfere by injunction. The court has no power to
arrest the course of public improvements, on account of their
effects upon the value of property, appreciating it in one place and
depreciating it in another. If special damage occurs to an individual, the law gives him a remedy. But he cannot recover either
in a court of law or equity, special damage as for a common nuisance, if the erection complained of be not a nuisance. A bridge
authorized by the State of New Jersey cannot be treated as a
nuisance under the laws of New Jersey. That the police power of
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a State includes the regulation of highways and bridges within its
boundaries, has never been questioned. If the legislature have
declared that bridges erected with draws of certain dimensions will
not so impede the commerce of the river, as to be injurious or
become a public nuisance, where can the courts of New Jersey find
any authority for overruling, reversing or nullifying legislative acts
on a subject matter over which it has exclusive jurisdiction ? Admitting, for the sake of argument, that Congress, in the exercise of
thc commercial power, may regulate the height of bridges on a public
river in a State below a port of entry, or may forbid their erection
altogether, they have never yet assumed the exercise of such a
power, nor have they by any legislative act conferred this power on
the courts. The bridges will not be nuisances by the law of New
Jersey. The United States has no common law offences, and has
passed no statute declaring such an erection to be a nuisance. If
so, a court cannot interfere by arbitrary decree either to restrain
the erection of a bridge or to define its form and proportions. It
is plain that these are subjects of legislative not judicial discretion.
It is a power which has always heretofore been exercised by State
Legislatures over rivers wholly within their jurisdiction, and where
the rights of citizens of other States to navigate the river are not
injured, for the sake of some special benefit to the citizens of the
State exercising the power.
But it has been contended, on the authority of a dictum of my
own, in Devoe vs. The Penrose Ferryl Bridge Company, "that the
Supreme Court have decided in the case of Penn. vs. The Wheeling Bridge, 13 How. 579, that although the courts of the United
States cannot punish by indictment the erection of a nuisance
on our public rivers, erected by authority of a State, yet that as
courts of chancery they may interfere at the instance of an individual or corporation who are likely to suffer some special injury,
and prohibit by injunction the erection of nuisances to the navigation of the great navigable rivers leading to the ports of entry
within a State." 8 Amer. Law Reg. p. 83.
It is true that this doctrine was enunciated as a corollary from
the Wheeling Bridge case, on a motion for an interlocutory injunc-
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tion against a bridge over a stream wholly within the territory and
jurisdiction of Pennsylvania.
On such motions I have always
refused to hear and definitely decide the great points of a case.
If there be a prima facie or even doubtful case shown, it is the
interest of both parties that the interlocutory injunction should
issue, and that the defendants should not expend large sums in
erections which may possibly be treated hereafter by the court as
nuisances. In the cases now before us, the same course was pursued; but after the full argument of this question on final hearing,
and a most careful consideration of it, I feel bound to acknowledge
that the dictum I have just quoted from the report of the case of
the Penrose Ferry Bridge Company is not supported by the decision of the Supreme Court in the Wheeling Bridge case. It is true
that such an inference might be drawn from a hasty or superficial
examination of the opinion of the court as delivered in that case.
But the point now to be considered, was not in that case, and could
not, therefore, have been decided. No judge in vindicating the
judgment of the court, can deliver maxims of universal application,
in every sentence, or oracles which may be read in two ways, one
applicable to the case before him, and the other not. To sever the
arguments of a judge from the facts of the case to which he refers,
will often lead to very erroneous conclusions. The fact that Pittsburg has been made a port of entry may have been mentioned as
an additional or cumulative reason why Virginia should not be
allowed to license a nuisance on the Ohio, below that city. But the
question whether the power to regulate bridges over navigable rivers
wholly within the bounds of a State, could be exercised by it below
a port of entry, and whether the establishment of such a port did
ipso facto divest the State of such a power was not in that case,
and therefore not decided. This assertion will be fully vindicated
by a careful examination of the record in that case.
1. It must be noted as a circumstance of that case, that although
the State of Pennsylvania in her corporate capacity was complainant, and "propter dignitatam" entitled to sue in the Supreme
Court of the United States; yet, that when the bill was filed, the
same complaint might have been sustained in the Cirtit Court of
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the United States, or the bridge might have been prostrated as a
nuisance by indictment in the proper state court of Virginia. The
bill charged that the bridge proposed to be erected was in utter
disregard of the license granted by its charter, which carefully
forbid the least interference with the navigation of the Ohio. On
the facts charged and proved, a Court of Chancery of Virginia,
would have been bound to enjoin the erection of so palpable -a
nuisance to the navigation. The case therefore presented every fact
necessary to give the court jurisdiction-a party having a right to
sue in the court-a nuisance proposed to be erected without the
sanction either of Virginia or the United States, and great special
damage to the plaintiff.
2. During the pendency of this suit, the Legislature of Virginia
saw proper to come to the assistance of their corporation, in the
unequal contest, and at its suggestion enacted that the bridge proposed to be built contrary to the license granted to the corporation,
was according to it, and not therefore to be considered as a nuisance
by the laws of Virginia-notwithstanding that the bridge was without a draw and for many days in the year would wholly obstruct
the passage of steamboats.
3. This legislation of Virginia being pleaded as a bar to further
action of the court in the case, necessarily raised these questions.
Could Virginia license or authorize a nuisance on a public river,
which rose in Pennsylvania, and passed along the border of Virginia,
and which by compact between the States was declared to be "free
and common to all the citizens of the United States ?" If Virginia
could authorize any obstruction at all to the channel navigation, she
could stop it altogether, and divert the whole commerce of that
great river from the State of Pennsylvania, and compel it to seek
its outlet by the railroads and other public improvements of Virginia.
If she had the sovereign right over this boundary river claimed by
her, there could be no measure to her power. She would have the
same right to stop its navigation altogether, as to stop it ten days
in a year. If the plea was admitted, Virginia could make Wheeling
the head of navigation on the Ohio, and Kentucky might do the
same at Louisville, having the same right over the whole river which
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Virginia can claim. This plea therefore presented not only a great
question of international law, but whether rights secured to the
people of the United States, by compact made before the Constitution, were held at the mercy or caprice of every or any of the
States, to which the river was a boundary. The decision of the
court denied this right. The plea being insufficient as a defence,
of course the complainant was entitled to'a decree prostrating the
bridge, which had been erected pendente lite. But to mitigate the
apparent hardship of such a decree, if executed unconditionally,
the court in the exercise of a merciful discretion, granted a stay of
execution on condition that the bridge should be raised to a certain
height or have a draw put in it which would permit boats to pass
at all stages of the navigation. From this modification of the decree
no inference can be drawn, that the courts of the United States
claim authority to regulate bridges below ports of entry, and treat
all State legislation in such cases as unconstitutional and void.
It is abundantly evident from this statement, that the Supreme
Court, in denying the right of Virginia to exercise this absolute
control, over the Ohio river, and in deciding that as a riparian
proprietor she was not entitled, either by the compact, or by constitutional law, to obstruct the commerce of a supra-riparian State,
had before them questions not involved in these cases and which
cannot affect their decision. The Passaic river, though navigable
for a few miles within the State of New Jersey, and therefore a
public river, belongs wholly to that State; it is no highway to other
States, no commerce passes thereon from States below the bridge
to States above. Being the property of the State, ana no other
State having any title to interfere with her absolute dominion, she
alone can regulate the harbors, wharves, ferries, or bridges, in or
over it. Congress has the exclusive power to regulate commerce,
but that has never been construed to include the means by which
commerce is carried on within a State. Canals, turnpikes, bridges
and railroads are as necessary to the commerce between and through
the several States, as rivers. Yet Congress has never pretended
to regulate them. When a city is made a port of entry, Congress
does not thereby assume to regulate its harbor, or detract from the
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sovereign rights before exercised by each State over her omn public
rivers. Congress may establish post offices and post roads; but
this does not affect or control the absolute power of the State over
its highways and bridges. If a State does not desire the accommodation of mails at certain places, and will not make roads and
-bridges, on which to transport them, Congress cannot compel it to
do so, or require it to receive favors by compulsion. Constituting
a town or city a port of entry, is an act for the convenience and
benefit of such place, and its commerce; bat for the sake of this
benefit the constitution does not require the State to surrender her
control over the harbor, or the highways leading to it, either by land
or water, provided all citizens of the United States enjoy the same
privileges which are enjoyed by her own.
Whether a bridge over the Passaic -will injuriously affect the
harbor of Newark, is a question which the people of New Jersey
can best determine, and have a right to determine for themselves.
If the bridges be an inconvenience to sloops and schooners navigating their port, it is no more so to others than to them. I see no
reason why the State of New Jersey, in the exercise of her absolute
sovereignty over the river, may not stop it up altogether, and
establish the harbor and wharves of Newark at the mouth of the
river. It would affect the rights of no other State. It would still
be a port of entry, if Congress chose to continue it so. Such action
would not be in conflict with any power vested in' Congress. A
State may, in the exercise of its reserved powers, incidentally affect
subjects entrusted to Congress without any necessary collisio n. All
railroads, canals, harbors or bridges necessarily affect the commerce
not only within a State, but between the States. Congress, by
conferring the privilege of a port of entry WJon a town or city, does
not come in conflict with the police power of a State exercised in
bridging her own rivers below such port. If the power to make a
town a port of entry includes the right to regulate the means by
which its commerce is carried on, why does it not extend to its
turnpikes, railroads and canals, to land as well as water? Assuming
the right (which I neither affirm or deny) of Congress to regulate
bridges over navigable rivers below ports of entry, yet not having
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done so, the courts cannot assume to themselves such a power.
There is no act of Congress or rule of law which courts could apply
to such a case. It is possible that courts might exercise this discretionary power as judiciously as a legislative body, yet the praise
of being "a good judge" could hardly be given to one who would
endeavor to "enlarge his jurisdiction" by the assumption, or rather
usurpation, of such an undefined and discretionary power.
The police power to make bridges over the public rivers is as
absolutely and exclusively vested in a State as the commercial power
is in Congress; and no question can arise as to which is bound to
give way, when exercised over the same subject matter, till a case
of actual collision occurs. This is all that was decided in the case
of Wilson vs. The Blackbird Creek, &c., 2 Peters, 257. That case
has been the subject of much comment, and some misconstruction.
It was never intended as a retraction or modification of any thing
decided in Gibbons vs. Ogden, or to deny the exclusive power of Congress to regulate commerce. NTor does the Wheeling bridge case at all
conflict with either. The case of Wilson vs. Th/e Blackbird Creek,
5c., governs this-while it has nothing in common with that of the
Wheeling bridge.
The view taken by the court of this point dispenses with the
necessity of an expression of opinion on the questions on which so
much testimony has been accumulated, what is the proper width of
draws on bridges over the Passaic ? How far the public necessity
requires them? What is the comparative value of the commerce
passing over or under them? What the amount of inconvenience
such draws may be to the navigation, and whether it is for the public
interest that this should be encountered rather than the greater one
consequent on the want, of such bridges? and finally, the comparative merits of curved and straight lines in the construction of railroads. These questions have all been ruled by the Legislature of
New Jersey, having (as we believe) the sole jurisdiction in the matter.
They have used their discretion in a matter properly submitted to
them, and this court has neither the power to decide, nor the disposition to say, that it has been injudiciously exercised.
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II. The second great question in this case is not affected by the
conditions of the first. The court has undoubted jurisdiction to
administer the relief here sought, if the complainants have shown
themselves entitled to it.
It is charged that the corporation called the " Proprietors of the
Bridges over the rivers Passaic and Hackensack" have a right to
bridge these rivers "exclusive of all other persons whatsoever, in
such manner as that no other bridge can be erected within said
limits, until the expiration of 99 years from the date of said original
act (1790), without the consent of said Proprietors." It is contended, also, that a majority of the stockholders cannot by law
surrender or release this exclusive privilege or franchise, and that
any law assuming to take away or authorizing any invasion of such
franchise, impairs the obligation of the original and fundamental
contract with and between the stockholders, and is therefore unconstitutional and void; and as a consequence, this court having
jurisdiction of the parties, is bound to protect their franchise from
invasion, on the complaint of any individual stockholder.
In order to a clear under standing of this point, it will be necessary to give a brief, but, nevertheless, a somewhat tedious history
of the legislative and other transactions connected with it.
Previous to the year 1790, the Passaic and Hackensack rivers
had been crossed by means of ferries only. In that year the Legislature of New Jersey passed an act "for building bridges over the
Passaic, Hackensack," &c. As this act is somewhat anomalous in
ts provisions, and subject to misconstruction, it will be necessary
,o notice some of its provisions. The first section nominates certain commissioners, "who are authorized to put in execution the
several services intended by this act." They are required to view
the ground from Y'swark to Powles Hook, and fix upon the most
suitable and convenient site for a bridge, and are authorized to
erect, or cause. to be erected, a bridge over each of these rivers.
The bridges must have a draw of 24 feet, lamps, &c. After having
agreed upon the sites of the bridges, they are required to lay out
the roads to them. If the bridge be fixed at the ferry, the commissioners were to pay for the ferry rights ; they were authorized also,
2
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at their discretion, to contract and agree with any person or persons
who would undertake to build such bridges for the tolls allowed by
the act; and for so many years, and upon such conditions as, in the
discretion of the commissioners, should seem expedient. This
agreement must be reduced to writing, signed and sealed by the
parties thereto, and recorded, " and to be binding on the parties
contracting as well as the State of New Jersey, and as effectual as
if the same and every part, covenant and condition thereof had
been particularly and expressly set forth and enacted in this law."
.The 15th section enacts-" That it shall not be lawful for any
person whatsoeve, to erect or cause to be erected any other bridge
or bridges over or across the said river Passaic, between its mouth
and second river, &c."
In February, 1793, these commissioners entered into a contract,
by indenture, with some thirty other gentlemen, reciting their
powers under the above act. By this deed they " demised, granted,
and to farm let" the said bridges to be erected "as hereinafter
declared, over said rivers, together with all tolls appertaining
thereto." "To have and to hold the said bridges, with their respective tolls and profits, hereinbefore mentioned, &c.," for a term of
97 years. In 1794 the stockholders in this company are constituted
a body politic and corporate, by the name of the "Proprietors of
the bridges over the rivers Passaic and Hackensack."
In 1832, "the act to incorporate the New Jersey Railroad Company" was passed.
As the proprietors of the bridges had claimed the sole right to
build bridges over the Passaic and Hackensack on the proposed
route of the railroad, the Legislature, .with a laudable regard for
private rights, authorized the railroad company to purchase turnpike roads and bridges on the route, or any and all the shares of
the capital stock of such roads and bridges. The stockholders were
to be paid the par value of their stock, or have railroad stack to the
same amount. As the stockholders in the bridge company were
probably the persons most interested in obtaining the railroad
charter, the act did not make it compulsory on the stockholders to
accept the value of their stock in money, or railroad stock, but left
it to the two corporations to arrange the matter among themselves.
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No difficulty appears to have been apprehended, as the railroad was
authorized to purchase the stock, and thereby control the other corporations, and more especially as the wealthy and respectable men
who owned the stock of the first were those most deeply interested
in the last. The act, while it contemplated that the railroad corporation should have the control of both the turnpikes and bridges,
did not permit the smaller corporations to be absorbed or annihilated by the greater, but ordained that the roads and bridges
should be preserved and governed by the provisions of their respective charters.
Accordingly, in November, 1832, the railroad corporation entered
into an agreement with the "proprietors of the bridges," reciting
the authority conferred on the railroad, and that the parties had
agreed upon the terms of sale of the stock of the bridge company;
and stipulating that the railroad pay to the stockholders of the
bridge company $150 for every share of their stock. It provided
that the stockholders electing to receive payment for their stock
according to this agreement, should show their assent before the
first of January following, and might elect to receive money or railroad stock 'to same amount, reserving their "1franchise privileges "as before held, and reserving also "all grants or privileges thereto.
fore made by way of commutation."
The reservations were made to meet the exigency of the proviso
to the 10th section of the act of incorporation of the railroad company -" That nothing herein contained shall be so construed as to.
impair any reversionary interest or vested rights which the State or
any incorporated company or individual may possess in virtue of an.
act for building bridges, &c., passed in 1790," &c.
By this agreement the railroad is permitted either to use the old
bridge or erect another along side, but so as not to obstruct, hinder,.
or interrupt the travel over the old bridge.
In pursuance of their act of incorporation and of their agreement,.
the railroad bought some 980 of the 1,000 shares into which thestock of the "proprietors of- the bridges," &c., was dilided, at the
price of $150 for each share of $100. They erected a railroad
bridge at the end of Centre street, which has been used for upwards
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of twenty years. As a new bridge is now found necessary, and as
the position of the old one requires sharp curves of the railroad
through the streets of the city, which are not only inconvenient but
dangerous, a supplement to the act incorporating the railroad was
passed on the 3d of April, 1855, authorizing the construction of the
bridge at Commercial Dock, and the removal of the old one at
Centre street, and of the railroad track connected therewith. It
requires the new bridge-to have two draws, each at least 65 feet
wide, on which a light must be kept at night, and a careful person
to open the draws for free passage of vessels, with the same provision as to reversionary interests as is found in the 10th section of
the original act. It requires also the consent of the "proprietors of
bridges," &c., in writing, under the corporate seal, and that the
giving of such consent shall not, except as to the said bridge so
consented to, be construed, held, or deemed in any manner to
strengthen or impair any rights or privileges which the said "proprietors may possess."
It is not worth while, for the purposes of this case, to inquire
whether the " proprietors of the bridges," &c., can claim any franchise of greater extent than that contained and accurately defined'
in their written agreement with the commissioners. It clearly does
not confer on them a right to build any other bridges than the two
described and specified, or take tolls therefrom. They cannot be
said therefore to have a monopoly for building of bridges within the
boundaries specified in the act. The instrument called a lease or
agreement defines the rights and the extent of the franchise granted
to the company; and it may well be doubted whether the provisions
of the 15th section, which are wholly omitted from their charter,
can be invoked as any part of their franchise. Nevertheless, as the
Legislature of New Jersey seem to have treated this section as in
the nature of a covenant by the State not to permit other bridges
to be erected which might injure the value of the franchise conferred
on the "proprietors " by the commissioners without the consent of
the corporation, we shall treat it as such-at best it is no more.
If the proprietors had the sole right to build bridges and take
tolls, their 'whole franchise might have been condemned by the
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Legislature under their right of eminent domain. A title to a
franchise is of no higher quality than a title to land. Such indiscreet contracts by a legislature cannot paralyze the arm of government and stop the progress of improvement for a century. The
legislature without attempting to define their rights or compelling
them to renounce them for a proper consideration have merely
suggested a very easy mode of getting over the difficulty. The
railroad is authorized to purchase out the whole stock and franchise
of the bridge company, by paying the full value thereof. Those
stockholders who did not choose to accept such terms know well the
purpose and object of this transaction was to give to the railroad
corporation the control of this claim to a monopoly, whatever might
be its validity or extent, without a destruction of the other corporate
privileges and faculties.
An acquiescence for more than twenty years in the exercise of
this right by the railroad will hardly leave room to question it now,
even if a majority of the stockhoiders should now be disposed to do
so. But the parties now objecting, do not seem absolutely to deny
the right of the railroad company to have a bridge over the Passaic
somewhere, provided it be bpilt so as to suit the private interest of
certain wharf owners. Their franchise to receive tolls and pass free
on their own bridge will not be impaired by the change. Nor is
there any evidence that the value of the bridge stock will be in any
manner affected thereby. When the legislature have decided that
the public interests require the change of location of the track of a
railroad, or a bridge connected with it, a court cannot be called
on to enjoin ,such a change because it will cause a depreciation of
property adjoining it, nor can members of the bridge corporation in
this case call for the intervention of the court to protect them
.against the acts of the majority of the ceorporators, unless for some
abuse of power, to the injury of the corporate privileges or property
of the minority. It is no part of the corporate franchise of the
proprietors, &c., that any of its stockholders who may chance to be
wharf owners, shall wield their corporate privileges to enhance the
value of their wharves.
This change of the position of the railroad bridge is authorized by
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law. It has the consent of the "proprietors," given in the manner
pointed out by law, under the seal of the corporation. In giving
this assent the corporation was acting within the scope of its powers,
and in a case where the will of the majority must necessarily govern,
when lawfully expressed. This is not a case where a majority of
the stockholders are employing the common fund for the accomplishment of a purpose not-within the scope of the institution. The
majority must decide what is proper compensation for any real or
supposed injury to their franchise of toll, which may result from the
change of position of this railroad bridge.
If it be part of their franchise to license other bridges, such a
franchise can only be exercised by the corporation under their
common seal and at the will of a majority. But it is plain that
another bridge erected without legislative authority might have
been treated as a nuisance, for whatever may have been considered
the nature of the supposed monopoly, neither the law, nor their own
lease, authorized them to build another bridge, or to give a valid
license to others. The legislature admit that they are bound by
contract not to authorize another bridge ; but on the principle of
"volenti non fit injuria" they have directed the railroad to obtain
the consent of the corporation with whom this contract was made;
whether this covenant was made with them originally as partners or
corporators, can make no difference in the case. In neither case
can a single individual by his negative vote control the majority of
the bodyi or compel it to give or refuse its consent as may suit the
interest of an individual or a minority.
This supposed franchise of forbidling the Legislature from
licensing a bridge over these rivers seems to have been a puzzle
for the learned lawyers of the State for half a century past; and,
as it is claimed by a large number of highly respectable, influential
and wealthy men, it has been treated with great reverence by the
Legislature, and the more so, as the lawyers could not agree in
defining what it was. Some have fancied it an incorporeal hereditament in each stockholder, which cannot be affected by the act
of another, having the quality of a polypus; and though divided
into one thousand parts or pieces, each one became a unit, or
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distinct whole; others have treated it as a rigit of common, in
which ccquilbet totum habet et nihil habet," an indivisible unit of
which, if a man has not the whole, he has nothing-and consequently a majority cannot dispose of it. But we do not think it
necessary to search the lumber garret of obsolete law, in order to
give a show of profound legal learning to an absurd conclusion. The
provisos in the different acts of Legislature, which have been invoked as conferring this power of obstruction on each one of one
thousand partners or stockholders, make no new grant of power or
franchise, and clearly refer to other valuable privileges, without
being open to such misconstruction.
Having, then, such evidence of the consent of the corporation as
is required bylaw, we cannot say it is insufficient. The allegations
in the bill, of irregularity or fraud in the election of the officers of
the corporation, and obtaining the act giving such consent, even if
sufficiently pleaded, have not been proved, and require no further
notice.
I am of opinion, therefore, on this point of thbmase, that the complainants have shown no legal right as stockholders of the corporation of "proprietors," &c,, to interfere and overrule the act of the
corporation.
lNIor have they alleged or shown such an improper use of the
common property of the corporation, or such deviation from its
original purpose, or abuse of the trusts confided to it, as will entitle
them to the interference of a court of equity.
The third and last question for consideration, is, whether the
railroad company has, by aiy valid contract, covenanted or agreed
with the complainant, or those under whom they claim as assignees,
that the railroad bridge over the Passaic shall be forever fixed at
Centre street, so that the company cannot, even with consent of
the Legislature, and for their own and the public benefit, change
the location of the bridge, shorten their road, and avoid difficult
and dangerous curves.
As we have already seen the question of the expediency or necessity for this change of route on the road, is one not submitted to
the judgment or discretion of the court. If the Legislature has
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authorized it, the railroad have a right to proceed, unless bound by
contract to maintain their bridge where it at present stands. The
answer denies the existence of any such contract.
Assuming that a contract which is to have the effect of forever
restraining the improvement of this road at this point can be
proved by parol, those who aver it, must be held to clear,
consistent, and undoubted evidence, as to the parties, the consideration and the precise terms of such contract. Have we such proof ?
Without wishing to make any remarks which may appear offensive
to any of the highly respectable witnesses who have given such
contradictory accounts of the transaction, it is too plain to be overlooked, that much of this conflict arises from the examination of
persons as witnesses who are the real parties in interest. The
transfer made post litem motam in order to constitute the complainant a party to the suit, is a veil too transparent to conceal the
real parties to the litigation.
. But waiving this objection to the testimony of certain witnesses,
as also any invidious comparison of the credibility of very respectable men, I must say that there is not such clear evidence of a
contract, its consideration, its parties or its terms, as would justify
a court in decreeing its specific execution.
It appears that originally the railroad company had purchased
the Commercial Dock property, with the view of erecting their
bridge there. As the town of Newark was then built, the railroad
would pass along its lower boundary. At this time railroads were
an untried experiment. It was a popular notion that it would be
of great advantage to a town or city to have a railroad pass
through its most frequented streets, that it would advance the value
of property on the streets through which it passed, and increase
their commerce; and that curves in a railroad were preferable to
straight lines, being much more graceful and no less useful.
From the prevalence of these notions, the popular feeling became
much excited; and the more so, that certain individuals of wealth
and influence, who owned wharves on the river, had shrewdly discovered that it would add considerably to the value of their property,
if the railroad instead of crossing below it, could be bent round
behind it, and crossing above, create an obstruction to the naviga-
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tion of the river above their wharves. Public meetings were held,
exhorting, entreating, and advising the railroad directors.Suits were brought by lot-holders in the name of the Attorney
General, threatening them with injunctions. Some wanted one
thing, some another, and the result is perhaps best described in the
graphic language of one of the witnesses:
,,
I can only say, that according to my recollection now, there was much confusion
and conflict of wishes among all the parties, and I don't know how many parties I
could count up. I know there were sharp speeches and feelings exhibited, as much
so as upon any thing I ever saw in this town, and to my view at the present moment,
they were like two dogs that had been quarreling, until they got tired and left off,
and there was a sort of a common consent to abandon the conflict, and not to keep
the progress of the work from going on, by a general assent of making the bridge,
where it is now. The location of the bridge was the result, but that there was any
contract or agreement that was to be final and conclusive and not to be revoked, I
know no such arrangement as that. There was a cessation of the conflict and the
work went on."

The directors, desirous of conciliating the people of Newark, and
expediting the completion of their road, yielded to the pressure,
and passed the following resolution, which had the effect of
*allaying the excitement. It is dated on the 24th of September,
1884, and is as follows:
,
"Whereas, considerable diversity of opinion has prevailed among the citizens of
Newark relative to the location of the railroad bridge across the Passaic river, and
the location mentioned in the annexed resolution having been agreed upon as a
mutual accommodation of conflicting interests, and with a view to the settlement of
all matters of controversy; now, therefore, be it
"1Resolved, unanimously, that the railroad bridge be located across the Passaic
river at the north end of the dock owned by Moses Dodd, with a draw of forty-five
feet in width; provided that the right of way from the westerly termination of said
bridge, to the entrance of the avenue on Market street can be obtained on reasonable terms; and provided also, that the owners of property on the above mentioned
part of the route of the railroad shall agree that the company may use any moving
power thereon which they shall deem proper."

And on the 26th of December, the following resolution was
passed:
" Fhereas, it is desirable that the bridge across the Passaic river be definitely
located, and whereas farther delay, in order that all difficulties may be removed, is
not deemed expedient, thereforeResolved, That the bridge across the Passaic river be, and the same is, hereby
definitely located, immediately north of the dock lately owned by Moses Dodd."
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These resolutions of the board, for the purpose of proposing an
accommodation of conflicting interests 'and putting an end to the
controversy, seem to have brought the dispute to a close, and received general aquiescence. But these documents exhib.it no
contract, binding the corporation never to change the location of
the road and bridge under any change of circumstances. They accordingly retained the Commercial Dock property, which was originally purchased for the purpose of a bridge. This proposit on and
resolution of the board was for the sake of peace. Those without had
conflicting interests-they were bound to no conditions, they gave
no consideration, except "1ceasing to quarrelwhen they,got tired."
Even the parties who had brought suits to frighten the directors
where not bound to withdraw them. The directors exercised their
own discretion under the circumstances. But time, which changes
all things, has produced a great change in the circumstances.Newark has become a great city. Locomotives moving at a velocity
of forty miles an hour, which were then considered but the dream
of the projectors, are now established facts. Curves have given
way to straight lines, and the notion that railroad cars darting
through the most frequented streets of a city are neither a convenience nor a benefit, has become obsolete. The conflicting interests
which inexperience and ignorance had originally produced, need no
longer to be propitiated for the sake of peace. The people of Newark
no longer object to having the bridge located where it was originally
intended to place it, and the people of New Jersey, by their
tegislature, have determined that it would be beneficial to the
public to have the old bridge, with its narrow and troublesome
draws, taken away, a new one erected below with larger and better
draws, and that the railroad should pass through the city by the
shortest route-by a straight line, and not with short curves.
The complainants have shown no contract made by themselves
with the railroad company, nor have they shown any covenant
running with the land on which they as assignees are entitled to a
remedy at law, or relief in equity.
Having thus disposed of the three great points so ably discussed
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by the learned counsel, the minor issues of fact or'law have become
immaterial, and need no further notice.
Let a decree be.entered in each of these cases dismissing the bill,
with costs.

In the Circuit Court of the United States, .Northern -District of
Ohio-July Term, 1857.
GEORGE S. COE, TRUSTEE VS. PENNOCK & HART, AND

THE CLEVELAND,

ZANESVILLE AND CINCINNATI RAILROAD.
1. A mortgage given on the entire property of a railroad, including future receipts
for transportation, with an agreement that property on the road subsequently
acquired, shall be bound, and a conveyance of it be duly executed, gives an
equitable lien on property subsequently acquired, to the bondholders of bonds
secured by the mortgage.
2. A charter must be construed according to the intent of the legislature, if such
intent can be ascertained, by the language used.
3. A person who constructs cars, or other rolling stock, for a railroad, if he deliver
the stock to the company, without any special provision to receive the payment,
can claim no lien on the work. He may effect this lien while the work is in his
possession. And if he obtain a judgment against the company for the work, an
execution cannot be levied on the rolling stock on which a former lien exists.
4. Where there are liens on the property of a railroad company, the liens must be
adjusted in chancery, where each claimant shall receive his proportionate share
of the proceeds. The appointment of a receiver is generally ruinous, and a sale
of such property should not be made, under a reasonable prospect of payment, by
a faithful application of the profits of the road.

Messrs. Otis and TFeyjman, for complainant.
Messrs. Spalding and Parsons,for respondents.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
McLEAAN, J.-The questions arise in this case on a motion to dissolve an injunction which had been granted, to stay an execution on
a judgment at law.
The bill states that the Cleveland, Zanesville and Cincinnati
Railroad Company, a body corporate and politic, created by the
laws of Ohio, and having its principal place of business at Akron, in
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Ohio, and within the northern district, on the first day of April,
1852, for the purpose of borrowing money to construct a railroad
from Hudson, in the county of Summit, to Millersburgh, in the
county of Holmes, executed and issued five hundred bonds .of one
thousand dollars each, payable in ten years from date, with interest
thereon at the rate of seven per cent. per annum, payable semiannually, until the principal shall be paid. That the company sold
the bonds for cash, which bonds were duly transferred to the complainant iii trust, &c. And the company duly executed a deed to
the complainant and to his successors in the trust, and thereby
made him assignee of all the present and future to be acquired
property of the company in the road to be made, including the
right of way, and the land occupied thereby, together with the
superstructures and tracks thereon, and all rails and equipments
procured or to be procured with the proceeds of said bonds, together
with all franchises, rights and privileges of said company; and
all property connected with the road was pledged for the payment
of the bonds and the interest. And in case of failure to pay the
interest or principal, as stipulated, the complainant; or those who
should succeed him in the trust, at discretion or at the request, in
writing, of one-half of the bondholders, then unpaid and unconverted
into stock, might cause said premises or so much thereof as might
be necessary to- discharge the principal and interest of all said
bonds as might be unpaid, to be sold at public auction, in the city
of Cleveland or in New York city, giving at least forty days' notice
of the time and place, and the specific property to be sold, &c., and
execute a conveyance of the property sold, which should bar the
company, &c. No advantage to be taken of stay laws or injunctions,
&c. Several locomotives and tenders were purchased, and a great
number of passenger and freight cars for the road, also baggage,
platform and gravel cars.
And the complainant represents that several of these cars have
been levied on by the marshal of the Northern District of Ohio, by
virtue of an execution issued on a judgment obtained by the
defendants, Pennock and Hart, against the company. And the
company subsequently contracted a large amount of indebtment to
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various banking institutions and individuals, for money borrowed,
and expended the same upon said road and for other purposes
connected therewith; and afterwards, on the 1st of December, 1854,
and after all the aforesaid locomotives, tenders, passenger cars,
baggage cars, platform cars, gravel and freight cars, had been procured and placed upon said road, the company executed and issued
bonds of that date, for various sums amounting, in the whole, to
the sum of seven hundred thousand dollars, payable in fifteen years
from the date thereof, and also interest thereon at the rate of seven
'per cent. per annum, payable semi-annually, and delivered said
bonds to its creditors, in some instances, as collateral security for,
and in other instances in payment of said indebtment. And the
company, by its deed, duly executed, conveyed and transferred to
George MIygott and his successors, in the trust thereby created, its
said equipments and appurtenances in the same manner, to the
same extent, and upon similar trusts to those expressed in the deed
to the complainant, &c. The said George Mygott accepted the
trust, and caused the deed to be recorded. About twenty-five
thousand dollars of these bonds have been used in payment to
creditors.
The complainant alleges that the company made default in the
payment of the semi-annual instalment of interestdue in October,
1854, and has ever since failed to pay the interest in full which has
become due, by which the legal title to the locomotives and other
property above specified on the road mortgaged or pledged as
above said, became vested in the complainant, to be divested only
on the payment of the semi-annual instalments of interest now due
on said bonds, and in fulfilment of the deed to make any further
assurance to complainant for more fully carrying into effect the
object of the first conveyance,-and particularly for the conveyance of any property more perfectly acquired subsequent to the
said deed, on the 7th of April, 1855, executed and delivered to complainant a further deed of said road; its equipments and appurtenances, embracing the property specified, which said deed the complainant had duly recorded.
And the complainant represents that the whole of said property
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is an inadequate security for the interest and principal as they shall
become due, on the first bonds of five hundred thousand dollars; and
that the company have no other means of payment than by the use
of the machinery on the road, in the transportation of passengers
and freight.
And the complainant further states, that sixteen bonds, dated
1st November, 1854, came into the hands and possession of the
defendants, Pennock & Hart, with full knowledge of the aforesaid
conveyances made to the complainant and the said George Mygott,
but they commenced suit on them, and on the 16th May, 1856,
obtained a judgment for $17,765 50, with costs, against the said
company. And that an execution having been issued, was levied
on the locomotives, tenders, passenger cars, platform cars, gravel
cars and freight cars of the road, which have been advertised for
sale by the marshal, &c.
The Cleveland, Zanesville and Cincinnati Railroad Company, in
its answer, admits the facts substantially as alleged by the complainant; and it alleges that the entire line of road proposed to be
constructed by it, extended from Hudson, aforesaid, to Zanesville,
in the county of Muskingum, at which place it would connect with
the Ohio Central Railroad, and also with the Zanesville, Wilmington
and Cincinnati road. And with the view of conforming the name
of the corporation to these lines of road, application was made to
the Court of Common Pleas of Summit county, for a change of the
name from that of Akron Branch of the Cleveland and Pittsburg
Railroad Company, by which it was incorporated and known, to
that df the Cleveland, Zanesville and Cincinnati Railroad Company;
and, such proceedings were had, that at the March term of said
court, 1858, it was ordered and adjudged that the name of the
defendant should be changed as requested; which decree was filed
in the Secretary of State's office the 17th of March, 1853, and also
published in a newspaper in. general circulation in the county of
Summit.
The defendants, Pennock & Hart, admit in their answers, that
the deed of 1852 was executed as alleged in the bill, but they deny
the validity of that deed, as it was not made in pursuance of the
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authority conferred on the company by law. They admit the
issuing of the five hundred bonds of one thousand dollars each, as
charged in the bill, but they allege the bonds were void, not having
been made legally. The power to construct a railroad from Hudson
to Millersburg is denied. When the deed of trust was executed,
they say, the right of way was not procured by the company, and
that the chattels on which the execution was levied had then no
existence. They say the interest has not for three years been paid
to the bondholders, or to persons for their benefit.
They admit the' execution of another trust deed in 1854, to secure
seven hundred thousand dollars in bonds; and they admit the execution of another deed to the complainant in 1855, but they say
that sixteen bonds, of one thousand dollars each, were issued under
the mortgage of 1854, which came into the hands of the defendants
in due course of trade; but they deny any notice of the mortgage
to the complainant. Tlese bonds were accepted by the treasurer
of the company, and were payable in New York in 1853 and 1854;
but they were not paid when due, and were protested. They were
received as cash in payment for making thirty-five house or freight
cars, and forty platform cars. These cars were made and delivered to
the company, between the 19th of May, 1853, and the 15th of
February, 1854; and the levy complained of in the bill was made
on these cars and others.
As the motion was made by the defendants, Pennock & Hart; to
dissolve the injunction formerly granted and dismiss the bill, the
case must be considered on its final hearing. .The merits seem to
be fully presented by the pleadings and the deposition of Simon
Perkins, the president of the company.
The first ground assumed in the defence is, that "the railroad
company, by whatever name it may have been called, had no
authority as a corporate body to make a railway from Hudson to
Millersburg; and as a necessary consequence, had no power to
borrow money for that purpose. The 'charter authorizes the con-'
struction of a railroad between certain termini, to wit, "from some
convenient point on the Cleveland and Pittsburg .Railroad, in Hudson, Summit county, through Cuyahoga Falls and Akron to
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Wooster, or some other point on the Ohio and Pennsylvania Railroad, between Massillon and Wooster."
The doctrine stated in the brief, "that corporate powers can
never be created by implication nor extended by construction," is
admifted.
The act under which this company was organized, was unskilfully drawn, and some of its provisions require a careful consideration to ascertain the intent of the legislature. It is entitled "An
act to amend an act to incorporate the Cleveland and Pittsburg
Railroad Company, passed March 14, 1886."
The first section provides, "that the Cleveland and Pittsburg Railroad Company be and they are hereby authorized to construct,
under the provisions of their charter, and in the manner hereafter
indicated, a branch railroad from some convenient point on the
Cleveland and Pittsburg Railroad, in Hudson, Summit county,
through Cuyahoga Falls and Akron, to Wooster, or some other
point on the Ohio and Pennsylvania Railroad, between Massillon and
Wooster, and to connect with, said Ohio and Pennsylvania Railroad,
and any other railroad running in the direction of Columbus; and
for this purpose may increase their capital stock one million of
dollars."
The 2d section provides, that for the purpose of constructing and
managing said Akron branch road, such persons as may have subscribed for the stock thereof, or for the major part of said stock,
may organize by the election of not more than seven directors, who
shall elect a President from their number; and, under the name of
the "Akron Branch of the Cleveland and Pittsburg Railroad Company," be entitled to all the privileges, and subject to all the
restricti~ns and limitations granted or imposed by the charter of
the Cleveland and Pittsburg Railroad Company, and the amendments thereto; and the Cleveland and Pittsburg Railroad Company may subscribe stock to said Akron branch road, and may aid
the said Akron branch organization, by the sale or guaranty of its
bonds or otherwise, as they may deem proper. And power was
given to the Akron Branch to make an arrangement with the
Cleveland and Pittsburg Railroad Company, in regard to the use
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of i1har road, and with any other company: Provided that the
Akron branch and the Cleveland road might merge the same, so as to
be under the direction of one company.
The 1st section gives the power to the Cleveland and Pittsburg
company to construct the Akron branch under their charter, designating the direction and limit of the branch. No other company or
organization is referred to, in regard to the structure and management of the road.
But the second section provides for a distinct and an independent
organization. The subscribers to the stock of the Akron branch
are authorized to organize by electing one of their number President, and under the name of the "Akron branch of the Cleveland
and Pittsburg Railroad Company," be entitled to all the privileges
and subject to all the restrictions and liabilities granted or imposed
by the charter of the Cleveland and Pittsburg Railroad Company,
and the amendments thereto." This adopts the Cleveland charter,
and applies to the structure and management of the Akron branch,
the same as to the Cleveland and Pittsburg road. The provision in
the fourth section of the act which authorizes the Cleveland Company to call a meeting of its stockholders at Ravenna, to act upon
the amendments of its charter and for the organization of the Akron
branch, in no respect conflicts with the second section. They were
required also to call, at the same time, a meeting of the subscribers
for the branch stock. Under the act, the subscribers had power to
accept the amendment as an extension of the Cleveland charter, as
the same interest, or to enter into a separate organization. The
latter was adopted, and the road has been constructed under it from
Hudson to Millersburg. This construction of the charter seems to
be clear of doubt. The organization was made the 17th of March,
1851, and was continued until the month of March, 1858.
At the term of the Court of Common Pleas held in that month,
in Summit county, it was ordered, on application of the company,
that its name should be changed to that of the "1Cleveland, Zanesville and Cincinnati Railroad Company." The requisites of the
statute seem to have been complied with, which authorized a change
of the corporate name, as was decreed by the court.
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But it is objected that the company had no authority to construct
a road from "Hudson to Williamsburg." The construction of the
road was commenced at Hudson, the northern terminus named in
the charter, in July, 1851. In 1852 it was extended by the way of
the Cuyahoga Falls, to Akron, and it was made to Williamsburg in
1854. The distance from Hudson to Orrville, which is the point
where the road intersects the Pittsburg, Fort Wayne and Chicago
railroad, is thirty-eight miles; and from Orrville to Williamsburg,
in Holmes county, it is about twenty-three miles, and this is the
southern teri~inus of the road at present.
The first section of the act provides that the road shall begin "1at
some convenient point on the Cleveland and Pittsburg road, in
Hudson, Summit county, and run .through Cuyahoga Falls and
Akron to Wooster, or some other point on the Ohio and Pennsylvania railroad, now called the Fort Wayne and Chicago railroad,
between Massillon and Wooster; and to connect with said Ohio and
Pennsylvania railroad, and any other railroad running in the direction of Columbus."
All the points named in the charter are touched by the road,
until it strikes Orrville, which is on the Ohio and Pennsylvania
railroad, and between Wooster and Massillon. Thus far there is
an exact compliance with the charter.
The Pennsylvania and Ohio road was not named in the charter
as its southern terminus. It was to connect with that road, and
any other railroad running in the direction of Columbus. This
language cannot be misconstrued. Millersburg, it appears is twenty-three miles south of Orrville, in the direction to Zanesville, to
whih place it is the intention of the company to extend their road.
At that point it will connect with the Central Ohio road, which
leads to Columbus. I think the company was authorized by the
charter to extend their road to Zanesville.
No one can suppose that the connection with the Pennsylvania
and Ohio road by the way of Crestline to Columbus, was intended
as the terminus of the road, as the distance, if not double, would
be much greater on that line than on a direct route. The same
objection applies in a less degree, perhaps, to the Steubenville and
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Newark road. The connection at Zanes'ville, on the Central road,
was the most direct route to Columbus, and it is within" a reasonable construction of the charter. I think, therefore, that Millersburg, being in the direction from Orrville to Zanesville, the road
was properly constructed to that point, with the view of its being
extended to Zanesville.
The first section of the act authorized the Cleveland Company,
in view of the Akron branch, to increase its capital a million dollars ; and under the second section of, the act, this provision is
applied to an independent organization, and gives to it all the privileges of the Cleveland and Pittsburg Company under its original
charter, subject to all the restrictions and liabilities which it imposes.
Here are corporate powers conferred to the extent of the charter
referred to.
From an act to revise and aniend "an act to incorporate the
Cleveland and Pittsburg Railroad Company, dated March 14th,
1836, Section 6, power was given to said company, by its proper
officer duly authorized by the directors, to mortgage, hypothecate or
pledge, all or any part of said railroad, or of any other real or
personal property belonging to said company, or of any portion of
the tolls and revenues of said company, which may thereafter
accrue, for the purpose of raising money to construct said road, or
to pay debts incurred in the construction thereof." And in the
act regulating railroad companies, passed February 11, 1848, in
the sixth section it is provided "Such company shall have power to
borrow money on the credit of the corporation, not exceeding its
authorized capital stock, at a rate of interest not exceeding seven
per cent. per annum, and may execute bonds or promissory notes
therefor, and to secure the payment thereof, may pledge the property and income of such company." To the same purport is the
act of 1852. Swan's Dig. 199-203.
In the defence it is assumed, that the mortgage or trust deed
made by the railroad company to ihe complainant is void, for the
reason that it pledges property "thereafter to be acquired," at least
so far as regards such after acquired property, and a number of
authorities are cited to sustain this position.
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In Comyn's Dig. Grant', D, vol. 4, page 810, it is said, "a man
cannot grant a thing which he has not.?' Moody vs. Wright, 13
Metcalf, 32; Chapman vs. Warmer, 4 Ohio, 481; 2 Story's Equity,
§ 1021, and other authorities are cited as sustaining this doctrine.
It is admitted that at common law, a man cannot grant or convey an effective title to land or any thing else to which he has no
right; but if this be done by general warranty, and he afterwards
acquires a title to the land granted, the first deed operates as a good
title by way of estoppel.
The term grant, in its largest sense, comprehends every thing
that is granted, or may be passed from one to another. It includes
incorporeal as well as corporeal rights ; but a feoffment was void
without livery of seisin. In his treatise on Equity, Mr. Justice
Story says, in regard to property that may be mortgaged, 2d vol.
§ 1021, "In equity, whatever property, personal or real, is capable of an absolute sale, may be the subject of a mortgage." Rights
in remainder and reversion, possibilities coupled with an interest,
rents, franchises, and choses in action may be mortgaged, but a
naked possibility or expectancy, such as that of an heir, cannot be.
By the civil law a party may mortgage property to which he has
no present title, by -contract or otherwise.
But it is not necessary to consider, at large, whether the mortgage in question, in regard to the equipments of the road acquired
subsequent to the date of the mortgage, is operative at common
law ; as, if it cannot be so considered, there can be no doubt it is
-good in equity, and the question comes before us on a bill in equity.
It seems to be admitted, as it is not denied, that the future profits
-of the road are subject to the mortgage. And what difference in
principle can there be in the future profits, and the necesssary
expenditure to produce.such profits? Repairs, when necessary, of
the rolling stock on the road, are not more within the mortgage
than the purchase of the necessary supplies of such stock, as the
public accommodation shall require. The mortgage was on 'a railroad in full operation, embracing every necessary equipment and
accommodatio6 to give to it the utmost efficiency. This entered
into the consideration of the parties to the mortgage, and any thing
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short of this, would, in a great degree, impair the security of that
instrument.
Suppose a sheriff or constable had levied upon one or more of
the passenger cars or of the locomotives, within a few days after
the machinery on the road was in motion; can any one suppose
that the mortgage could 1ave been defeated or its security impaired
by such a step. Will it not be said that in such a case the stock
would be within the protection of the mortgage; this no one could
doubt, as a withdrawal of the stock from the road would not only
impair the obligations of the mortgage, but defeat its object. In
this respect, a railroad in operation must be considered as protected
in the capacity in which it was mortgaged; and this is so manifest
that the public, and especially subsequent creditors, are bound to
know it. But the protection by the mortgage of the equipments
upon the road, in the case supposed, are not more indispensable
than to keep them in repair, replace them when destroyed, or add
to them when required by the public exigencies; these are all
within the purview of the mortgage, the contemplation of the
parties, and known to the public.
Does this view impose any hardship on the manufacturer of a
part of the equipments, subsequent to the date of the mortgage?
Certainly it does not. He has a right to retain the possession of
his work until it is paid for or the payment secured. Having
delivered possession to the company in the ordinary course of business, without receiving the payment, he can assert no lien upon it
either in law or equity; he stands in relation to the company on a
footing with other creditors who have no security for their debts.
In Mitchell vs. Winslow et al., 2 Story Rep. 639, Mr. Justicd
Story says, "1courts of equity give effect to assignments, not only
of choses in action, but of contingent interests, expectancies, and
also of things which have no actual or potential existence, but rest
in mere possibility only. In respect to the latter, it is true, the
assignment can have no positive .operation to transfer in prosenti,
property in things not in esse; but it operates by way of present
contract, to take effect and attach to the things assigned, when and
as soon as they come in esso; and it may be enforced as such a
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contract in rem, in equity. The same doctrine is laid down by
Lord Hardwicke. Also, it was so held in Hobson vs. Travor, 2 P.
Williams, 191; Carleton vs. Laightor, 8 Meriv. 667; 5 vi. &
Selw. 228; Curtis vs. Auber, 1 Jacob & Walker, 506, 512;
1 Mylne & Keen, 488; Langton vs. Horton, 1 Hare, 549;
Mitford vs. Mitford, 9 Yes. 100. In his Equity Jurisprudence,
sec. 1231, Mr. Justice Story says, "In equity there is a lien, not
only on real estate, but on personal property, or on money in the
hands of a third person, wherever that is a matter of agreement, at
least against the party himself, and third persons who are volunteers
and have notice. For it is a general principle in equity, that as
against the party himself, and any claiming under him voluntarily
or with notice, such an agreement raises a trust."
The mortgage having been placed upon record in the three counties through which the road was to be constructed, and was in fact
constructed, I suppose it must operate as a notice of its contents.
See Hawthornvs. New Castle and North Shields Railway Company,
reported in Cross on Liens, Appendix, 408; Abbot vs. Goodwin, 20
Maine Rep. 408; 2 AppI. & Shep. 408; Macomber vs. -Parker,
14 Pick. 497.
The third ground assumed is, "that the trust deed is void for
uncertainty as to the nature and extent of the grant."
The instrument has been attentively read and considered, and no
uncertainty is perceived in its conditions, or as to the objects on
which it is to operate. If its language were so vague as not to
specify these matters with at least reasonable certainty, the mortgage could not be specifically enforced. But as this objection does
not seem to arise on the face of the instrument, and has not been
shown in the brief of counsel, no further examination will be
given to it.
In the fourth ground, it is contended that the mortgage is void
under the statute of frauds.
As the trust deed was entered into under the enactments of the
legislature, it certainly cannot be said to be against the policy of
the law; and it is not perceived that any of its provisions conflict
with the statute of frauds, seeing that they are authorized by a law
subsequent to that statute.
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In the fifth and last ground it is contended, "the plaintiff does
not show himself entitled to call upon this court to stay the hand
of the judgment creditors."
The first mortgage to the complainant Coe, was dated the 1st of
April, 1852; the second to the same individual bears date in
March, 1855.
Prior to the execution of the second deed of trust to the complainant, a mortgage similar to the one first executed to the complainant, was given to George Mygott, by the same company and on
the same road, its equipments, &c., dated 1st of November, 1854,
to secure the payment of bonds to the amount of seven hundred
thousand dollars, which it was proposed to issue for the completion
of the road, &c.
It appears that the company employed P. F. Geisse to build for its
use on the road, a number of cars of different descriptions; and that
in payment of the balance of his account, on the 20th November,
1854, he received sixteen of the second mortgage bonds secured by
the trust deed given to George Mygott. The judgment complained
of, was obtained on these bonds by Pennock and Hart.
As the first mortgage of the complainant was executed the 1st
of April, 1852, it is contended by the defendants' counsel, that the
first mortgage cannot avail him, as to the two locomotives, the
Hercules and Vulcan, and the passenger cars 8, 4, 5 and 6, none
of which were in existence until the fall of 1858, and the spring
of 1854. And that before the execution of the complainant's
second mortgage, in March, 1855, this property had been conveyed
to George Mygott, by thetrust deed dated November 1st, 1854, to
secure sundry bonds, of which the sixteen on which the judgment
was entered, formed a part.
This argument rests upon the hypothesis, that as the two locomotives and passenger cars referred to were received by the company
after the d~te of the first mortgage, and before the second mortgage
was given to Mygott, and as the bonds on which the judgment was
obtained, were secured by the second mortgage, the complainant can
claim no lien on this property under his first mortgage.
The passenger cars and the locomotives referred to, were in
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possession of the company and employed upon the road, some
months before the mortgage was executed to Mygott.
It appears that Geisse, before he received the sixteen bonds, had
taken from the company a draft for the amount due, on New York
or some other place, which was returned protested for non-payment.
On the return of the draft, the bonds were paid to him as the only
means of payment, within the power of the company. From this
statement it is clear,: that the defendants Pennock and Hart, as
creditors of the company, stand upon no other ground and have no
higher claim than any other holders of bonds issued under the
second mortgage. Geisse the builder of the cars, having delivered
them to the company, without taking a special lien, if he continued
to be the holder of the bonds, would have no better claim than the
defendants, who are his assignees. The bonds, it is presumed, are
payable to bearer, and pass by delivery. Pennock and Hart are
purchasers in the market, the same as other holders of bonds,
covered by the second mortgage.
A part of the gravel cars levied on by the sheriff were sold, with
the consent of the counsel in this case, and also of the complainant
and the first bondholders ; but the levy is understood still to include
cars, &c., which belonged to the company when the first mortgage
was given.
In the first mortgage, for the consideration stated, the company
covenanted to "1execute and deliver any further reasonable and
necessary conveyance of the premises, or any part thereof to the
party of the second part, his successors in said trust, and assigns
for more fully carrying into effect the objects hereof, particularly
for the conveyance of any property acquired by said parties of the
first part, subsequently to the date hereof, and comprehended in
the description contained in the premises." It is presumed the
third mortgage deed to the complainant was executed in 1855,
under this covenant. Entertaining the opinion that, the first
mortgage, by virtue of the above and other covenants which it contains, operated as an equitable mortgage on subsequently acquired
equipments for the road, which was not displaced by the second
mortgage, it is not deemed necessary to inquire what, if any, legal
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effect can be given to the last mortgage. _Povey vs. Brown,
14 Conn. 255:
It is alleged in the bill, that the entire property of the road, will
be inadequate to the payment of the first mortgage. The wisdom
of the first bondholders was manifestly shown, by permitting the
road to remain under its present management, being satisfied that
the directors had discharged their duties faithfully and economically. This seems to be the only course that can retrieve the affairs
of the company. In most cases, to place such a concern in the
hands of a receiver, involves it in hopeless ruin.
Had Pennock and Hart, as holders of the sixteen bonds, a right to
bring suit on them at law, and having obtained a judgment, to sell
on execution a part of the mortgage property, without reference to
the claims of other creditors under the same or other mortgages?
Against such a procedure there are three insuperable objections:
1. A sale on execution would convey to the purchaser no exclusive
right to the property sold. 2. Such a sale would not divest the
equitable rights of other bondholders. The purchaser could receive
only the same and no greater right, than that which was vested in
them by the bonds. 3. The claim must be prosecuted in equity,
where all who have an interest in the subject matter, may be made
parties. In equity only, can the rights of all the parties be properly adjusted. And this is especially the case where the property
mortgaged is inadequate to the payment of all the creditors. In
addit on to these considerations, from the nature of the property
levied on, it could not be separated from the road, without *uspending, in whole or in part, its operations. And what could be more
unjust than this, to the other bondholders? The operation of the
machinery on the road, in the transportation of passengers and
freight, constitutes its chief value.
The railroad, like a complicated machine, consists of a great
number of parts, a combined action of which is essential to produce revenue. And as well might a creditor claim the right to levy
on and abstract some *essential part from Woodworth's planing
machine, or any other combination of machinery, as to take from a
railroad its locomotives or its passenger cars. Such an abstraction
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would cause the operations to cease in both cases. As before remarked, the proper mode of enforcing payment against a railroad
company, on bonds secured by mortgage, is, to bring the creditors
and the railroad company into chancery, where the earnings of the
road, through a faithful agency, may be distributed equitably among
the creditors. And in a case where such a course would not satisfy
the reasonable demands of creditors, to sell the road and distribute
among them its proceeds. Such an extreme procedure, however,
should not be authorized by any court, except under circumstances
of absolute necessity. 13 Serg. & Rawle, 210; 9 Georgia Rep.; 9
Watts & Sergt. 27.
A stronger ground for an injunction than is taken in this case,
could not well be conceived. The defendants, under a judgment at
law have levied upon a large part of the rolling stock on the road,
which, if sold and removed, will stop its operations, while the same
stock is under mortgage to creditors whose lien is prior to that of
the defendants. Such a procedure, if carried out, in this and other
cases, would defeat the liens of creditors in such cases to many
millions of dollars, and put an end to the structure, if not the maintenance, of railroads.
The court will perpetually enjoin the proceedings in the case at
law, as prayed by the bill, at the costs of the defendants, Pennock
and Hart.

In the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District
of Pennsyflvania, in Equity-Maly, 1857.
CRESSON VS. CRESSON.

1. Testator, domiciled at Philadelphia, devised certain lands in Pennsylvania to
twelve trustees "in trustfor the formation and support of a home for aged, infirm
or invalid gentlemen and merchants, where they may enjoy the comforts of an
asylum-not eleemosynary, but as far as may be by the addition of their own
means, and by reference to the Prytaneum of ancient Athens, an honorable homewith the hope that it may be perpetuated and enlarged by the bequests of its
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gratefal inmates, until it shall become worthy of the city of Penn, and a blessing
to a class whose wants have hitherto been overlooked; leaving to my trustees fall
power to conduct and carry out this institution on the best possible plan, and to
provide for its permanent usefelness in or near my native city."
2. On bill filed and claim made by the residuary devisees under the will, and by the
heirs at law of the testator, to have the devise declared invalid, inoperative and
void-eld,
That the devise was good under the laws of Pennsylvania, and was valid as a
charitable use.
Whether independent of the charitable character of the devise it could be sustained as a trust, quoere?

St. Geo. T. Campbell, Junkcin, Parsonsand Bell, for the residuary
devisees and heirs at law.
-R. K. Price and J.B. Townsend, for the trustees.
KANE, J.-The testator, Mr. Elliott Cresson, a resident citizen

of Philadelphia, made the following provision by his last Will and
testament:"I give and bequeath to my friends, Joseph R. Ingersoll, Eli K.
Price, John W. Claghorn, E. F. Rivinus, Frederick Fraley, William Parker Foulke, Thomas S. Mitchell, Dr. Kirkbride, Joseph
Harrison, and my executors hereinafter named, my lands in Clinton county, Pennsylvania, or the proceeds thereof, if sold during
my lifetime, in trust for the foundation and support of a home for
aged, infirm, or invalid gentlemen and merchants, where they may
enjoy the comforts of an asylum,-not'eleemosynary,-but, as far
as may be, by the addition of their own means, and by reference to
the Prytaneum of ancient Athens, an honorable home; with the
hope that it may be perpetuated and enlarged by the bequests of
its grateful inmates, until it shall become worthy of the city of
Penn, and a blessing to a class whose wants have hitherto been
overlooked,-leaving to my said trustees fall power to conduct and
carry out this institution on the best possible plan, and to provide
for its permanent usefulness in or near my native city."
The legal validity of this provision is the only subject of controversy in the present suit.
I may be misled, perhaps, by a desire to establish such a trust as
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I think this was intended to be; but the question has not seemea
to me at any time a doubtful one under the established law of Pennsylvania. It is by reference to this law that it must be considered
and decided,-a law, in some respects, more liberal and wiser than
that of England, though not dissonant from it in principle,-the
law,' under which charities have taken root and borne fruit among
us beyond any example to be found in those States that have yielded
to a less enlightened policy.
Yet, I would by no means be understood as implying, that such a
charity as this would not commend itself to the guardianship of the
English Chancery. There is not, so far as I have read, and never
has been, an objection statutory or judicial, to the recognition of a
purely charitable use, where the donee was not a corporation. The
inhibition in Ilagna, Charta referred only to lands given to religious
houses ; and so did the statutes that followed it. There never was
a time, as both the argument and the judgment in 'Vidal vs. Tke
City, 2 How. 128, justify me in affirming, when a grant or a devise
to an individual, for an adequately expressed use, not superstitious,
was without protection in England.
Moreover, in determining what uses were adequately expressed,
the English Chancellors have been ingenious even to astuteness on
the side of charity. The cases that were cited in the discussion
before us show this sufficiently ;-but there are a few others equally
if not more striking. Among them is that of Townsend vs. Carus,
3 Hare, 257, where the trust was "to pay, divide and dispose unto
and for the benefit or advancement of such societies, subscriptions,
or purposes, having regard to the glory of God in the spiritual
welfare of his creatures, as the trusteesin their discretion, shall see
fit." Another, not less marked, is that of Wldcker vs. Rume,
decided in 1852, 10 E. L. & E. R., where a bequest was sustained
" upon trust to apply and appropriate in such manner as the trustees
in their absolute and uncontrolled discretion think proper and expedient for the benefit and advancement and propagation of education
and learning in every part of the world." This reminds one of the
language of Mr. Smithson, "an establishment for the increase and
diffusion of knowledge among men ;" but it is not the broadest of
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the cases in the modern books, I think the bequest in Nightingale
vs. Grouldbourn, 2 Phill. 594, to the Chancellor of the Exchequer,
"to be appropriated to the benefit and advantage of my beloved
country, Great Britain," which was sustained as a charity, may
claim a still greater latitude of application; and the trust for "the
increase and encouragement of good servants," (public, it might be
argued, as well as domestic,) devolves an equally large discretion on
the trustees; Loscombe vs. Wintringham, 13 Beav. 87. But the
case which has struck me most forcibly, as it is the latest, is one
decided by the Master of the Rolls in November last, to which I
have been guided by the learned annotator of the forthcoming edition of"Hill on Trustees. It is that of the University of London
vs. Yarrow, reported in the 26th volume of the Law Journal, 70.
The bequest there was for "founding, establishing, and upholding
an institution for investigating, studying, and, without charge beyond
immediate expenses, endeavoring to cure maladies, distempers and
injuries, any quadrupeds or birds, useful to man, may be found subject to ;" and to pay a salary to a "superintendent or professor of
the institution and its business," who shall "annually give on the
business of the said institution at least five lectures in English and
free to the public :"-a sort of barn-yard sanatarium,held valid as
a charity under the statute of Elizabeth.
So much as to the law of England. But the immediate question
is as to our own. And here we may begin by remarking, that however our courts may have at any time differed in their theories as
to charitable uses, their controlling aim throughout all the decisions
has been to guard against the failure of a charity. We know now,
that the statute of 43 Elizabeth was only remedial, as indeed its
words import, and that the policy it sought to vindicate was part
and parcel of the more ancient English law. But when Pennsylvania was settled, this truth had not yet been developed by the
researches of legal antiquaries; and more than a century later,
Lord Loughborough, commenting on Porter's case in 1 Coke, 16,
doubted whether his court could have established a charity before
the statute. Attorney aeneraZ vs. Bowring, 1 Yes. 726.
The men who founded this commonwealth in 1682 were probably
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no better read in the mysteries of jurisprudence than the lawyers
they left in the old country ; but they brought with them principles
of civil polity, matured in suffering, that determined easily and
wisely what was that law of England which approved itself to their
circumstances. They founded no church establishment, for they
held that Almighty God is the Sovereign Lord of conscience; and
they repudiated the whole absurdity of superstitious dissent,-if for
no better reason,-because it had been the offensive stigma of their
own religious opinions, and they had fled to the wilderness to escape
from it. They instituted no -poor-rates; but they knew that the
poor must be always with them, and their sectarian usages had
taught them to distinguish between the silent beneficence of a
brotherhood and the ostentatious, degrading charity of an almshouse. It is the questionable wisdom of much later times that
rejoices in disseminating corporate immunities: William Penn's
associates held their church lands, and endowed their schools, and
managed their charities, without them; and so did their successors
for four-fifths of a century. How could the doctrine of charitable
uses, the exceptional corrective of a system that sought to regulate
conscience by law and that denounced ecclesiastical endowments,
find a place in the common law of such a people?
We incline therefore to the opinion so ably enforced by Judge
Baldwin, in the case of Zane's 1i1, 1 Brightly, that as there never
was a superstitious use in Pennsylvania, to be extruded by the law,
so there was no need of the device of a charitable use to save
a trust which sound policy commended. But, whether so or not,
the case of Witman vs. Lex, 17 S. &. R. 93, has placed our Pennsylvania charities on a perfectly safe basis. "1It is sufficient to
say," in the words of Chief Justice Gibson, " that it is immaterial
whether the person to take be in esse or not; or whether the legatee were at the time of the bequest a corporation capable of taking
or not; or how uncertain the objects may be, provided there be a
discretionary power vested anywhere over the application of the
testator's bounty to those objects; or whether the corporate designation has been mistaken; if the intention sufficiently appears in
the bequest, it is to be held valid." "We certainly," he adds, in
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-Pickering vs. Shotwell, 10 Barr, 25, "will not let a charitable
bequest fail, where there is a discretion or an option given to the
trustee; and if he cannot apply it to all the contemplated objects,
it will be sufficient if he can apply it to any of them; nor need
the power to act at discretion be expressly given, if it can be implied
from the nature of the trust."
Taking this then as the law of the State, let us turn to the disposition in Mr. Cresson's will.. It is in trust, as we read it, with
scarce a change except of punctuation, " for the foundation and
support of a home for aged, infirm or invalid gentlemen and merchants, where they may enjoy the comforts of an asylum;" this
asylum not to be "eleeniosynary," but sustained by the inmates
"as far as may be, by the addition of their own means ;" and its
character, "1by reference to the Prytaneum of ancient Athens,"
that of "1an honorable home." Words follow expressive of the
testator's hope that the institution may prosper and be enlarged by
endowments from its inmates; and then the trustees are fully
empowered to "conduct and carry it out on the best possible
plan."
It is said this is equivocal-first, as to the beneficiaries, and
second, as to the scheme of beneficence. It is asked, who is a gentleman, and who a merchant? I do not propose to answer the
question ex cathedrd. There is no language so precise, that a
judge can safely pass upon its import, till time and contingency
present the occasion for interpretiuig it. Who are "the poor,"
Whitman vs. Lex, and other cases innumerable? Who "the blind,
the lame," Com. vs. .Elliott? Who the "orphans," TFidal vs. The
City? No doubt these are adequate designations in a charitable
bequest. Yet poverty is only a relative term; the absolutely blind
and lame are understood not to be within the provision of the Wills
legacy, but only those whose infirmity may be susceptible of cure;
and the Girard College was organized for several years, before its
officers, though assisted by all the critics, could determine which one
of three definitions was the appropriate one to be given to Mr.
Girard's language. I am not aware that either of these bequests,
abundantly litigated as they were in their day, was ever assailed for
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uncertainty of its terms. "Gentleman" and "merchant" may be
words, to which the different lines of a dictionary attach different
meanings; as they do, indeed, to almost all the words of our language ; but they are words defined-good English words; and when
occasion requires, it may be hoped that the trustees or a court will
be able to understand them. It is not enough to impeach a charitable use, or any use whatever, that men are not undivided as to the
meaning of its phrases. How often are our courts occupied in the
interpretation of wills of all sorts, and how often does a revisory
tribunal instruct them that their interpretation has been wrong!
Is there a fatal ambiguity in the scheme of beneficence, the nature
of the charity? Let us look at the language of the trust, referring
ourselves, step by step, to the standards of lexicography.
It proposes to establish "a home," a dwelling-place-" not eleemosynary," not living upon alms, not depending upon charity,
for the inmates are to contribute from "their private means ;"-and
it is to be accounted "an honorable home," admission to it being
"a token of honor," by analogous reference to the Prytaneum of
Athens, "in which the liberty of eating was one of the highest
marks of honor." (See 7"ohnson's -Dictionary,and the .EncycZopcedia Americana, title Prytaneum.)

The persons to be admitted are "gentlemen" and "merchants."
The latter of these terms has been defined judicially and by statute, over and over again, as every one conversant with the bankrupt law knows: whether the same definition is the appropriate one
in this case, may be gravely doubted; but it is enough for our purpose, that, in the absence of a better, it ascertains for us who may
be the beneficiaries under Mr. Cresson's will. A "gentleman,"
according to Dr. Johnson, is 1st, "a man of birth, of extraction,
but .not noble," in which sense the term does not belong to the
language of our country; but 2d, it also describes "a man raised
above the vulgar by his character or post," the very man, in this
sense, for whom all would solicit an honorable home. And, finally,
the inmates of this "asylum" or place of retreat, are to be
"aged, infirm, or invalid," old, or feeble, or disabled by sickness.
I have gone through all the words, with the aid of Johnson's
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quarto. The interpretation they suggest has struck me from the
first as the natural and obvious intent of the testator. It is easy to
travesty his meaning; to define a gentleman as one almost noble by
birthright, a merchant as an importer of foreign goods or a dealer
in tape and pins,- and to laugh at an American Prytaneum, as a
place where laws are to be digested or wheat stored. And it might
be ably argued, that the institution could not be a charity, because
it is described as "not eleemosynary."
But by what right shouldwe so negative the objects of thebequest?
Our law books may tell us that "eleemosynary" is contradistinguished to "civil," and that it imports something "constituted for
the perpetual distribution of the alms or bounty of the founder,"
2 Kent Coin. 274,-a definition, by the way, that invites many qualifications to make it applicable to the very law it purports to illustrate.
But Mr. Cresson was not a lawyer; he no doubt thought that he
had defined his own meaning of the term, when he said that his
inmates should contribute, if practicable, something towards their
own support; for he may have reasoned, that a man who ministers
to his wants from his own means, and is loo..ed to as one who may
endow the home in which he is living, cannot properly be said to be
"living upon alms" or entirely "dependent on charity," which, according to Dr. Johnson, is the characteristic of "eleemosynary" life.
It would hardly be argued, that a foundation, such as we have
supposed was within this testa or's v.ew, is not in law and in fact
a charity. It would be against the spirit of the age to withhold
from it this title, simply because the inmates were expected .to help
the institution that helped them, or because the just sensibilities of
the founder had taken pains to distinguish it from a poorhouse. It
would be to rule out all our best charities from the category, our
hospitals, colleges and churches among the rest.
It is the beautiful characteristic of our Christian charities, that
they do not wait for penury and pauperism to invoke their benevolence. They know that in our country absolute destitution is the
almost certain badge of profligacy ; and they seek to maintain even
among the poorest, that honest pride which revolts at the idea of a
confessed dependence upon alms. The religious society to which
3
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Mr. Cresson belonged has always been remarkable for the cautious
secrecy with which it makes provision for its poor. I have never
heard of a quaker pauper; and I believe there are very few, even.
among those who contribute most largely to the liberal assessments
of the sect, who know to what individuals or in what measure their
charity is dispensed. I believe, too, it is the fact, that their beneficiaries, except the very infirm, do something or appear to do something towards their own maintenance.
We have considered the case thus far, as presenting the question
of a charitable use. It was easiest so to consider it. But the court
is not to be understood as expressing a formed opinion that the
devise might not be supported upon the basis of an ordinary trust.
The donees are designated by name; they are competent to take
and hold, and their estate is defined; and the cestuy que trusts,
the character and extent of their several interests, and the circumstances and manner in which the fund is to be applied to their
benefit, might seem adequately set out by reference to the discretion vested in the trustees: id certum quod certum reddi potest.
The leading object of the trust ascertained ; they have "full power
to conduct and carry out the institution on the best possible plap,
and to provide for its permanent usefulness."
Meanwhile, as has been intimated already, this court does not
undertake to define for them the terms of Mr. Cresson's charity.
It is enough that we see how it can'be established without violence
to his words. We need not transmute a Roman Catholic priest
into the congregation before which he officiates, nor masses for the
dead into an easement for the living, as was done in McGinn vs.
Aaron, 1 Pa. R. 49 ; nor are we called, on to explore for a general
intent, more lawful than the particular intent that was in the view
of the testator.
We find nothing unlawful in the objects of this will, no ambiguity
as to the trustees who are to take, no want of competency in them
to hold and administer, no embarrassing doubt as to the class of
beneficiaries or the character of the bounty. If ever we shall be
called on by the trustees to advise them, or by some third party to
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control them, it will be time enough for us to revise our present
understanding of the words of the trust.
For the present, we need only say, in the language of Chief
Justice Taney, Fontaine vs. .Ravenel, 17 How. 396, that we see
nothing in "the object of this bequest so indefinite or so vaguely
described, that it could not be supported as an ordinary trust ;"
but we do find "a bequest to persons capable of taking, and beneficiaries under the devise sufficiently certain and defined to be made
the recipients of such a gift,"-which therefore "1a court of
chancery, in the exercise of its regular and inherent jurisdiction in
relation to trusts, would establish and protect, even if the objects,
thereof were somewhat vague in their character, and although such
devise contained a charity." Per Daniel J., ibid. 397.
Per our. The bill must be dismissed.

In the District Court of the United States for the Wisconsin
-District.
PATRICK CUMMINGS AND WILLIAM MURRAY vs. WILLIAM D. MEAD.
1. Where negotiable paper has been put in circulatio

by fraud, proof of the cir-

cumstances may be given; when it is incumbent on the holder to show, that he
is a holder bonafide and for a valuable consideration.
2. If a negotiable note is accepted in satisfaction of a previous debt, the person so
receiving it is a holder for value, and is protected. But not so when a note is
handed over to a creditor, with directions to collect it and to retain the surplus;
and afterwards the debt was settled.

It then reverted to the former holder.

3. Unless a note is taken in good faith for a valuable consideration, the holder is
considered as being in privity with the endorsee.

A merchant having purchased

a note at an extraordinary rate of discount, after he learned that the payees, as
merchants had failed, and that the money was wanted to pay preferred debts,
is not a bona fide holder .against the previous lien of a judgment creditor's
bill-particularly if the parties to the negotiation are relatives.

He should have

inquired into the circumstances of the holders.

MILLER, J.-William D. Mead paid into court the amount of
this -judgment; when Jacob Shear and others and Samuel F. Pratt
and others, made their several applications, that it be paid to them.
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These parties had obtained judgments in this court against John C.
Burr and Morgan Craig; and after the return of executions unsatisfied, they filed creditor's bills in equity against said Burr and
Craig, and also against Mead. Injunctions were issued and served,
restraining the defendants from disposing of, or in any manner
parting with any money, promissory notes, or other property belonging to said Burr and Craig. The njunctions were issued and
served on the fourth of August, 1856, and an order of reference
for the appointment of a receiver. On the second of December
following, Cummings and Murray recovered a judgment in this
court against Mead, upon a promissory note made by him, to said
Burr and Craig, or bearer; the amount of which is now for appropriation by this court.
These creditors of Burr and Craig allege that the promissory
note, on which the judgment was rendered against Mead, was in
the hands of Burr and Craig, or one of them, at the time their
bills in equity were filed and injunction issued; and that Cummings
and Murray are not bona fide holders for a valuable consideration.
The deposition of Robert H. Maynard was read at the hearing;
in which he states that he is a merchant in the city of Buffalo, in
the State of New York. He received the note of Burr abouL the
middle of August, 1856, at Buffalo. He took two notes of Mead
to Burr and .Craig, of one thousand dollars each; for which he
gave fifteen hundred dollars. He knew Burr before that. He
had married his (Burr's) sister. He had before that, understood
that the firm of Burr and Craig had stopped payment; he did not
know they were in litigation with any person at Beloit, Wisconsin,
(where they had been in business as merchants) or elsewhere. He
did not know or inquire for what consideration the notes were given.
He gave Burr his check on the Bank of Attica for fifteen hundred
dollars, bearing date September 8th, 1856. He delivered this note
to Cummings and Murray, whom he owed about five hundred dol-.
lars, and told them to credit him with it-to collect it and credit it
to him, and the balance he would take. The account of Cummings
and Murray has since been settled, and the note is not settled yet.
The purchase of the two notes of Burr was absolute. The note he
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let Cummings and Murray have, had about twenty or thirty days to
run, after he bought it. The other note had about four months to
run. Burr attempted to sell the notes at a broker's, in Buffalo;
but he could not sell them without an endorsement. He then proposed to him to sell the notes, at fifteen hundred dollars. Burr
said the notes were good; -that the maker was worth twenty thousand dollars, and had real estate in the State of New York. Burr
said he wanted to pay some confidential debts with the money.
The broker offered, if he (Maynard) would endorse the notes, to
take them at the usual rates, of from three to five per cent. per
month for western paper, which he refused.
The judgment creditor's bills having been filed, while the note
was in the hands of the judgment debtors, Burr and Craig, an
equitable lien was thereby created on the note in their hands, and
on the debt secured by it, in the hands of Mead the maker. Sub.
sequently Burr, one of the defendants and one of the payees in the
note, committed a fraud upon .those creditors, and also 'upon the
court, by transferring the note to Maynard, in the city of Buffalo.
Those creditors claim the money co lected on the note, by virtue of
their bills in equity. And they contend that the note was put in
circulation by the payees, Burr and Craig, fraudulently; and that
Maynard was not a bona fide purchaser of it from Burr and Craig;
and also, that it was not transferred to Cummings and Murray in
the regular course of commercial business, for a valuable consideration.
Burr and Craig have not made an answer, nor'given any explanation of the matter. Nor have they attempted to show what was
done with the fifteen hundred dollars received for the notes. This
case stands as a bill in equity, at the suit of the creditors, against
Burr and Craig, and also against Mead, Cummings and Murray,
taken as confessed against Burr and Craig.
The rule is, "that when negotiable paper has been stolen, or lost,
or obtained by duress, and is put in circulation by fraud, proof
of these circumstances may be given against the plaintiff; and
on such proof being given, it is incumbent on the plaintiff, to show
himself to be a holder, bona fide and for a valuable consideration;
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otherwise he is considered as standing in no better situation than
the former holder, in whose hands the instrument received the
taint." Part only of this principle is applicable to the present
case ; for the note is paid-and the question of the holder's title is
raised, not to let in a defence of the debtor, but to meet a hostile
claim of title to the money, which the creditors assert by virtue of
their bills in equity. That the note was put in circulation fraudulently by the payees, there is no doubt.
I shall first inquire into the nature of the transfer of the note to
Cummings and Murray by Maynard.
It is well settled, that if a negotiable note is accepted in satisfaction and discharge or extinguishment of a previous debt, or liability,
the person so receiving the note is a holder for value, and is protected against equities. Swift vs. Tyson, 16 Peters, 1; 1 American
Lead. Cases, 191. But that is not this case. Maynard only owed
Cummings and Murray five hundred dollars, which he ordered paid
out of the avails of the note, and the residue to be returned to him.
There is no allegation that the note, or any part of it, was intended
to pay future advances to Maynard. And it appears that the
account of Cummings and Murray against Maynard has been settled.
Maynard continued to claim an interest in one-half of the avails of
the note, which he was to draw from Cummings and Murray when
collected. But in the settlement of the account, the -whole note
reverted to Maynard.
If the claim of these creditors did not
interpose, Maynard would be entitled to draw out this money. I
am clear that Cummings and Murray are not entitled to the money
in their own right. If those creditors are not entitled to it, Maynard is; and Cummings and Murray may be considered as mere
parties in the record in trust for, or for the use of Maynard.
Promissory notes carry their whole evidence of title on their face;
and the law assures the right to him who obtains them for valuable
consideration, by regular endorsement or delivery, and without
actual notice of an adverse claim, or of such suspicious circumstances
as should lead to inquiry. The doctrine of implied notice by I'
pendens is inapplicable to such cases generally of attachments and
garnishee process. Such proceeding has been held unavailable
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against a bona fide holder of negotiable paper, who claims it after
attachment, before maturity, and without notice. Keiffer vs. -Ehler,
6 Harris, 888.
An attachment is a special proceeding, issued by any court
or magistrate for a debt. In a ease of bankruptcy, notice
may be implied; because that refers to the general circumstances
of a previous holder; into which a purchaser is expected to
inquire. If a man becomes a bankrupt, all his property, in
which he is beneficially interested, is vested by the assignment
in the assignees, by relation to the act of bankruptcy, so as to
defeat all intermediate acts done by him to dispose of his property;
and consequently the right of transfer of a bill or note, is in general
vested in them from the time of the act of bankruptcy; and the
defect of title in the endorser may be taken advantage of under
the plea of non assumpsit. Chitty on Bills, 149, London edition.
And on page 618, it appears that bills of exchange and promissory
notes endorsed by a bankrupt after he had dishonored bills, and
been otherwise irregular in his payments, may be retained by the
endorser, unless it were known to him at the time, that the insolvency of the bankrupt was decidedly a general inability to answer
his engagements.
The proceeding in equity, by judgment creditors' bill, is not a
commission in bankruptcy, but in effect as to the property of the
debtor, it is similar to it. In both cases the property of the debtor
-is a fund in court for the payment of debt. The court retains possession of the fund, for distribution among creditors according to
principles governing the proceeding. And while the property is in
the custody of the court, no sale of it can beg made, either on execution, or otherwise, without leave of the court. By this proceeding in equity, all the estate of the debtor is bound from the filing
of the bill and service of process, and is virtually sequestered.Even a judicial sale of real estate, under execution upon a prior
judgment is void; Wiswall vs. Sampson, 14 Howard, 52. - This
proceeding against failing merchants is as common here, as bankrupt commissions in England. But whether an endorsee is purchaser of negotiable paper of a merchant, after the filing of a
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creditors' bill against a payee or endorser, should be held to stand
in the same situation as the endorsee of a bankrupt, I need not
determine. This proceeding almost uniformly follows the failure of
mercantile firms; and it is confined to the circuit courts of the State,
and to this court.
Burr and Craig were merchants in Beloit, in this State, and Maynard was informed that the firm had stopped payment, at the time
he purchased the notes of Burr, and thereby he supplied him with
money to pay confidential or preferred debts of the firm. One note
was payable thirty days after the date of Maynard's check for the
purchase money; and ihe other had but three months to run after
that date. The usual rate of discount of western paper was from
three to five per cent. per month ; but the rate at which these notes
were purchased was ten per cent. per month, upon the assurance
that the maker was perfectly good and owned real estate in the State
of New York. Unless a note is taken in good faith, for a valuable consideration
and without notice, the holder is considered as being in privity with
the endorsee. This privity is created when the note is taken under
suspicious circumstances, such as ought to have put the endorsee on
his guard, and would have alarmed a man of ordinary prudence.Such is the rule of the American cases generally, and of the early
English cases ; but it is restricted by later English cases, to such
circumstances as not only show gross negligence on the part of the
endorsee, but actual malafides; 1 Smith's Leading Cases, in notes,
447, &c., and cases there cited.
I do not think there is any. difference in principle, whether the
circumstances of suspicion arise from a note over due, or a bill dishonored, or from marks or characters on the face of the paper, as in
Farabee vs. Brently, 14 Peters, 318 ; or from facts communicated
and made known dehors the paper. Maynard had notice of the
general inability of Burr and Craig to pay their debts, which would
defeat his claim to the money as against an assignee in bankruptcy.
He had notice of sufficient facts to induce him, as a prudent man,
to inquire more into the circumstances of Burr and Craig, before
purchasing the notes. From the notice he had, and the extraordi-
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nary discount allowed by Burr, the suspicion of a prudent and
careful man would naturally be excited; and he should feel it his
duty to ask questions, which, in the ordinary and proper manner in
which trade is conducted, he ought to ask respecting the holder's
circumstances.
To protect the endorsee, a valuable consideration paid, with due
and reasonable caution is necessary. If Maynard, after receiving
notice of the failure of Burr and Craig, and that the notes were for
sale at a discount of ten per cent. per month, to pay preferred debts
had inquired of Burr, he might have learned of the proceedings in
this court, and of the escape of Burr, from this jurisdiction, to
avoid the service of process, and the assignment of his property to
a receiver. To place Maynard in the most favorable position, he is
a voluntary purchaser of the note for a valuable consideration; but
not in good faith, as he did not use the caution necessary to inform
himself of the circumstances of Burr and Craig, the payees, and
of their right to negotiate the note.
So far I have treated Maynard as a stranger to Burr; but he was
not. Burr and he are brothers-in-law. Maynard could legally
purchase a note, or any thing else, from his brother-in-law; but the
relationship existing between them is a fact, which holds him to
stricter proof of the bona fides of the transaction, than is required
of a stranger, when the right to make the negotiation is disputed
by creditors. The transfer of property, by a relative in failing, in
embarrassed circumstances, to a relative, is a suspicious circumstance, that must, in all cases, be clearly and satisfactorily explained.
The money will not be paid to Cummings and Murray, but to
these creditors of Burr and Craig.

